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What is the difference between a lie, bullshit, and a fake news story? And is it
defensible to lie, bullshit, or spread fake stories? The answers are, unsurprisingly,
complex, often defy simple affirmative or negative answers, and are often context
dependent. For present purposes, however, a lie is a statement that the liar knows or
believes to be false, stated with the express intention of deceiving or misleading the
receiver for some advantageous gain on the part of the liar. On the standard definition
of a lie, the liar’s chief accomplishment is deception—and it can be artful:
When we undertake to deceive others intentionally, we communicate messages
meant to mislead them, meant to make them believe what we ourselves do not
believe. We can do so through gesture, through disguise, by means of action or
inaction, even through silence. (Bok 1999[1978]: 13)
The standard definition has, in the Western philosophical tradition, antecedents
stretching all the way back to St Augustine. However, the classic definition may be
too restrictive as not all lies are stated with the intention to deceive. Any number of
statements can mislead through misapprehension, incomprehension, poor understand-
ing of, or partial access to the facts. To mislead, further, is not the same as lying, or as
serious, and we can rely less on a liar than we can on a person who misleads. The one
who misleads may do so by Bfalse conversational implicature^ (Weber 2013: 653),
expressing propositions that are not intended to be informative or to further the ends of
conversation.
Lying, in contrast to misleading, can damage both credibility in assertion (the direct
expression of a proposition such as that all the evidence available proves that climate
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change is a hoax) and in implicature (Weber 2013) (‘I did not have sexual relationswith
that woman’, Clinton insisted in 19981). Lying attracts greater opprobrium than does
misleading because the deception is intentional and the harm, potentially, is far reaching:
When we discover that someone we trusted can be trusted no longer, it forces us
to reexamine the universe, to question the whole instinct and concept of trust. For
a while, we are thrust back onto some bleak, jutting ledge, in a dark pierced by
sheets of fire, swept by sheets of rain, in a world before kinship, or naming, or
tenderness exist; we are brought close to formlessness. (Rich 1995: 192)
The deceived can feel wronged, sometimes profoundly so. Nevertheless, some lies
may be necessary and morally defensible such as a prosocial lie to save a target
from a hit squad. Some lies are polite untruths which are stated in order to observe
etiquette and avoid injured feelings as in ‘thank you for a lovely meal’ which the
diner found bland. And some, arguably, do little or no harm, and may avoid
cruelty. A tactless ‘yes’ to a patient who asks if she has cancer is truthful but lacks
discretion and judgement.
While not all lies should be ruled out, lying should not be promoted as a moral
good. For one thing, lying can destroy trust and living in a world in which truth-
telling is not common practice would be difficult, impractical, and alienating. So
many of our interactions are based on trusting others to do what they will say they
will do, and that they have the necessary knowledge, skills and experience they
claim to have, in order that we can go about our business efficiently, with
confidence and knowledge. Without trust, Baier (1986) tells us, what matters to
us would be unsafe—our children, health or goods we entrust to others for
safekeeping. Though we can find trust in immoral relationships, such as in a
sexist marriage or an exploitative company, or for a President many of whose
statements ought to be distrusted, we need trust in order to create and sustain what
makes our lives meaningful. The simple Socratic truth is that no person is self-
sufficient and no person is able by herself to look after all that matters to her: we
need to trust and entrust to others (Baier 1986). Trust, further, ‘in some degree of
veracity functions as a foundation of relations among human beings’ (Bok
1999[1978]: 31).
Bullshit is different from lying and it need not undermine trust, particularly
when it is blatant. In his now well-known and oft-cited essay On Bullshit,
Frankfurt (1985 [2005]) states that B[o]ne of the most salient features of our
culture is that there is so much bullshit. And everyone knows it^. With arguably
the greatest bullshitter of all daily promulgating on Twitter (and other media) his
assessment of the facts, truth and fakery, it is hard not to agree that we are being
dumped on from on-high by no less a person than the President of the USA. In
contrast to the liar who must have some regard for the truth in order to artfully
subvert it, the bullshitter has no such concern or constraint. His ‘focus is pano-
ramic rather than particular. He does not limit himself to inserting a certain
1 Clinton made this infamous denial at a White House press conference on January 26, 1998. The denial can
be watched here: https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/january-26-1998-response-
lewinsky-allegations.
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falsehood at a specific point, and he is thus not constrained by the truths sur-
rounding that point…’. (Frankfurt 1985 [2005]) The liar and the bullshitter both
pretend to tell the truth. The manipulative liar, in contrast, wants to lead us away
from apprehending the truth. The bullshitter is not so scrupulous or meticulous.
He is less concerned with how things really are, being neither for nor against truth,
and often knows we know he is bullshitting. Unlike the liar, Frankfurt informs us,
the bullshitter is less analytical and less deliberative, and exercises greater freedom
to play around with the truth or facts. Social media seems to be the space in which
we see so much evidence for these kinds of epistemic vices.
Why does there seem to be so much bullshit? In 1985, Frankfurt explained that
‘the production of bullshit is stimulated whenever a person’s obligations or
opportunities to speak about some topic are more excessive than his knowledge
of the facts that are relevant to that topic’ (Frankfurt 1985 [2005]). In 2018, along
with a pervasive and balkanised social media ecosystem and high internet immer-
sion, public life provides abundant opportunities to bullshit and lie on a scale we
could have scarcely credited 30 years ago. According to research carried out by
the Pew Research Center (Smith 2018), social media posts tend to be overly
dramatic or exaggerated versions of the truth, and people are likely to make
accusations and start arguments about an issue without consideration of the facts.
Then, we have fake news. The irony of the denigratory epithet ‘fake news’ is
that a news item described as fake need not be intentionally misleading. Brazen
hoaxes, satires, pranks or parodies may be judged as ‘fake’ news but they need not
be slurs on the truth. Often, the intention is to parody or satirise real events in
order to force deception, humbug, lies and misrepresentations of the truth out into
the open. They often serve social critique (or distraction). What Trump is railing
against is that the news may be truthful, factual and representative of reality. He
wants to undermine the trustworthiness and credibility of the news by asserting
that it is ‘fake’ when he should, in fact, say it is ‘misleading’, ‘incorrect’,
‘deceptive’ or ‘lying’. But perhaps this would be going too far for a bullshitter
of his stature. This may indicate poor comprehension of English, or ‘fake’ may be
easier to say or comprehend than the multisyllabic alternatives. More ominously,
the assertion of fake news seems to be designed to delegitimise the press (Lakoff
and Duran 2018). But a more basic truth is that fake news is any credible reporting
that Trump and his adherents do not like.
Continual assertions of ‘fake’ news, repeated lies and endemic bullshit reduce
complex and diverse realities to dangerously fatuous and nonsensical assertions.
Epistemic insouciance, ‘a casual lack of concern about the facts, or an indifference
to whether political beliefs or statements have any basis in reality’ (Cassam 2018:
2), may be one consequence of all the claims of fakery and bullshit. The insou-
ciant finds it inconvenient to find out the facts and answers to complex problems.
In any case, the insouciant or the sceptic might ask, ‘in whom can we trust and
why should we bother when we’re going to be lied to anyway?’ (This does not
detract from the baffling fact that many of Trump’s supporters appear to take him
seriously. Whether they take him literally is another matter. Trumpites, like
Brexiteers, may be predisposed to believe the lies.) But insouciance is no answer:
it is potentially a harmful stance because it means ‘not giving a shit’ (Cassam
2018: 2) for the truth or the status of facts. These vices can undermine epistemic
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trust, authority and justice, resulting in epistemologies of ignorance in which the
beliefs and attitudes of the listener are shaped in particular ways to suit those who
seem intent on deception.
Digital environments appear to have thrown the traditional Truth-Trust dialectic
into jeopardy: the sheer volume of information now makes it difficult to know
what information to trust. How we come to acquire the information we encounter,
and how we use it to understand the world around us, has been radically redefined
since Frankfurt’s (1985 [2005]) essay. Not only is there an increase in the volume
of news content that is consumed on social media, but the eco-system within
which it operates is also increasingly balkanised, in which networks of users will
mostly read or consume information that conforms to their existing world view,
and conflicting perspectives, even if they are authoritative, are suppressed. Users
are increasingly reliant on algorithms and their own social media networks to
determine what news, commentary and political opinion they see and consider
(Bhatt and MacKenzie 2019). This is leading to the development and perpetuation
of online ‘echo chambers’, a social epistemic structure which reinforce the beliefs
of its members, and which, perturbingly, actively discredit relevant voices
(Nguyen 2018). The Internet is also a place for scammers and con-artists to carry
out virtual crimes with online scams such as phishing scams, ‘advanced fee’ fraud
and even false greeting cards which look they are from friends but once clicked
download malicious software onto a machine. These are egregious forms of
malicious deception, of which lying is only a part. Deceivers, bots and liars,
through coercive or surreptitious acts, deny control to the deceived, and by
withholding or distorting information, by faking who they are, they remove the
means to make meaningful choices.
The consequences are clear: lack of respect for the dignity of the person and
inequality because power rests with the deceiver. Lies are a vice that affects the
distribution of power, inflating the power of the powerful while reducing the power
of the deceived to make informed judgements. The harm to the marginalised, to those
who have legitimate claims to know the facts, to democracy, to anyone who values
truth and honesty, is the perpetuation of inequality. The further harm is the spread of
prejudice, confusion and distrust in institutions, news sources and figures in whom we
normally have grounds to grant epistemic trust.
So why is trust important? Because truth is a prerequisite of trust, and trust,
according to Macleod (2015), is necessary to any civilisation. Trust has instrumental
and intrinsic value. As Bok (1999[1978]: 31) memorably states: Bwhatever matters to
human beings, trust is the atmosphere in which it thrives^. If we cannot trust, then all
we may have are the starry heavens above and the moral law within us.2
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